The endogenous dynamics of a closed constant returns multi-market economy are examined in which agents face downward sloping demand. The trigger for growth in this model is a technological change that warrants costly adjustment in input quantities by agents. In the resulting dynamic game, relative prices within markets remain constant. Consequently, all own price elasticities are constant. In markets characterized by lower cost of capital the unique outcome is collusion in which agents do not incur adjustment cost and there is no adoption of new technology. But in other markets a unique non-cooperative equilibrium exists in which agents do incur the cost of adopting the new technology. Only three specifications of adjustment costs are feasible. Output increases along an S-shaped time path with or without a non-explosive cyclical component.
Introduction
In an earlier article in this journal (Sinha, 1997) , I had shown how investment in productivity by firms in an economy in which products were weak gross substitutes could lead to S-shaped time paths of output in the case of quadratic adjustment costs and had pointed out that other specifications of adjustment cost could result in cyclical time paths (p. 8). This paper extends that model in three ways. First, I relax the assumption of weak gross substitutability. Second, I explicitly model the cost of capital to highlight the role it plays in the adoption of new technology. And third, I show that only three specifications of adjustment costs are feasible and that the shortest time path between two levels of output has an S-shape with a cyclical component.
My model is one of endogenous growth cycles. The time paths of output may be cyclical, but there are no recessions in this model of a closed economy with the dollar gross national product (GNP) held constant. Endogenous growth is the result of conscious economic choices made by the agents. It occurs due to technological progress involving a shift of the isoquant map such that less input is needed for any output. Samuelson (1965) had shown that the competitive solution of directing technological progress to reducing unit cost was not optimal. Early models, therefore, analyzed either a planned, or a competitive economy at the aggregate level, relying on externalities due to investment in education, research, knowledge, and the like, to drive growth (Nordhaus, 1967; Uzawa, 1965; Phelps, 1966) . Following Romer (1986), recent models exploit Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977) framework of monopolistic competition in which own price elasticities of firms are identical and constant. These models rely on increasing returns disguised in the form of learning-by-doing à la Arrow (1962), on specialization, or an externality due to either education or research to generate growth. Aghion and Howitt (1998) provide a good review of this work.
My model differs from the above in five ways. First, I model a multimarket economy with asymmetric, monopolistically competitive agents (monopolists for short). Own price elasticities turn out to be constant only because of a constraint in equilibrium. Second, I explicitly assume constant returns. Third, I model the cost of capital and show that growth results from non-cooperation among monopolists with high costs of capital. Fourth, I allow agents to enhance productivity in a manner they choose -by investing in quality control, value engineering, business process re-engineering, and the like. And fifth, I permit households to invest part of their savings into the development of new markets. Agents in these markets can exist only by helping buyers reduce the costs of their current output or utility. This makes endogenous technological progress feasible and helps the economy sustain growth.
The trigger for growth is a productivity enhancing change in technology that, if adopted, will result in a different optimal input mix for the agents. Adoption is not costless and gives rise to the problem of intertemporal substitution. In the resulting dynamic equilibrium, agents in markets with lower cost of capital collude and do not incur adjustment
